INCLUSION THROUGH EXCLUSION: EXPLOSION OR IMPLOSION?

Nicholas De Genova

“The sources of social solidarity are drying up, with the result that social conditions of the former Third World are becoming commonplace in the urban centers of the First World. These trends are crystallizing in the phenomenon of a new ‘underclass’…. An underclass produces social tensions that discharge in aimless, self-destructive revolts and can only be controlled by repressive means…. In addition, social destitution and physical immiseration cannot be locally contained; the poison of the ghettoes infects the infrastructure of the inner cities, even whole regions, and penetrates the pores of the society as a whole. This leads finally to a moral erosion of the society.…” 1 --Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory

“The racial connotations carried by the ascription, ‘the Third World’, are captured most clearly in their usage by those in the United States and Europe who warn that blacks, the Gastarbeiter immigrants, and asylum seekers are turning their respective societies economically and culturally into Third World countries…. the racialized situation of guest workers in Europe, not that different from Mexican migrants in California, is increasingly obviated against the reconstructed measuring stick of a European identity. Their strictly economic status as guest workers transforms into a supranational, superracial one against the backdrop of a European identity.”2 --David Theo Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning

“Naming the Underclass makes the Underclass, nominates it into existence, and constitutes its members at once as Other…. the notion of the Underclass explicitly erases the exclusionary experiences of racisms from social science analysis while silently enthroning the demeaning impact of race-based insinuations and considerations.”3

--David Theo Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning

Destitution, immiseration, moral erosion – an infectious poison haunting Europe – such is the cataclysmic gloom that one of Europe’s most celebrated luminaries cast upon the historical moment when nothing less than a new Europe seemed to be incipient. The source of this corrosive and presumably devastating contagion? A nefarious “underclass,” apparently sequestered in urban “ghettoes,” reinventing the so-called Third World (and its proverbial heart of darkness) in the “inner cities” of urbane and enlightened Europe. An under-class – something pronouncedly less than a proper social class with its own historical significance, moreover – which purportedly manifests itself only in futile and self-destructive forms that “can only be controlled by repressive means.” In short, a kind of utterly abject excess – something crudely apprehensible as mere human rubbish. But who are these scoundrels? Or rather, if they are indeed more akin to a poison or a social disease that “infects” and “penetrates the pores,” then the more apt question would seem to be: what is this vermin? The subject of the essay in question, after all, is what Jürgen Habermas deems to be the beleaguered plight of nation-states, national sovereignty, and citizenship, and more specifically, the ways in which these are “challenged from within by the explosive potential of multiculturalism”4. The culprit is figured only elliptically, in terms of a “constantly growing” heterogeneity of “cultural forms of life, ethnic groups, religions, and worldviews”5, distinct from “the inherited or ascribed nation founded on ethnic membership”6, and associated with “transnational developments”7. It is seldom called by its more conventional or prosaic name – migration – and much less is it ever recognised candidly as concerning a question of race.

In this brief essay, I will seek to destabilise some of the nationalist or racial conceits that serve as the premises of conventional intellectual discourses and political debates surrounding those mischievous changelings, “inclusion” and “exclusion,” with particular reference to their currency for the politics of immigration (and race) in the contemporary European scene. This attempt to re-frame those questions by interrogating their presuppositions will unfold through a concise critique of the complacencies and complicities that may be discerned in Habermas’ remarks on “multiculturalism” and “immigration,” not so much in order to contribute in the more narrowly scholastic sense to anything pretending to an exhaustive dissection of this aspect of Habermas’ philosophical corpus, as such, but rather because his discourse around these preoccupations would seem to be highly symptomatic and thus revelatory of the larger malaise with which this special thematic issue is concerned.

With regard to this woeful nemesis – the new “underclass” – notably, Habermas does indeed acknowledge the salience of “globally interconnected ... labour markets”8, which he affiliates with “the sharp increase in the reserves of comparatively cheap labour”9. However, such an equation of “Third World” migrants with “cheap labour,” once supplemented with the notion of an “underclass,” immediately marks a resort to the effectively racialised themes of moral panic. As “cheap” labour (by implication, “stealing jobs” and undermining the social condition of the presumptively entitled “native”/ “national” working class) and somehow simultaneously as an “underclass” (inevitably, underemployed, unemployed, or un-employable, and leeching off the purported beneficence of the welfare state), we find ourselves in the presence of what Étienne Balibar has depicted as an “immigration complex,” which induces “a transformation of every social ‘problem’ into a problem which is regarded as being posed by the fact of the presence of ‘immigrants’ or, at least, as being aggravated by their presence”—regardless of the problem in question.10 And when phrases like the “moral erosion of the society” begin to become an uncritical currency in the luminous heights of European philosophical discourse, what we are witnessing, surely, is a very troubling deterioration in morale, and perhaps also a frightful failure of political imagination, in an important quarter of European intellectual life.

Despite the overtly liberal, social democratic, and cautiously “multiculturalist” agenda of Habermas’ interventions, one cannot help but be struck by the profusion in his discourse of the tell-tale totems – ostensibly de-racialised but implicitly and incorrigibly racial – transposed directly from contemporary social science in the United States. Above all, among this noisy cacophony of genteel and banal euphemisms for class inequality and racial subjugation, there is the ever-contemptible and worrisome Underclass – the most glaringly peculiar import of all from hegemonic U.S. sociology’s compendium of raciological “science.” Loïc Wacquant has rightly cautioned against just such “a new ‘urban Orientalism’ … of which the ‘underclass’ would be the loathsome figurehead”11. And David Theo Goldberg incisively connects the dots among these multifarious but interrelated figures – the Third World, the Underclass, the Inner City, and so forth – for their abundant excess of racial significations. Perhaps most salient of all is Goldberg’s detection of a rejuvenated racial project of expressly “European” identity, against which a precisely post-colonial whiteness is refashioned against the amorphous, heterogeneous, non-descript, yet essentialised and decidedly “culturally” inimical mass of “immigrants,” who come to be encircled by an ostensibly race-neutral but mercilessly racialised sort of generic alterity, which may be glibly credited as “Third World.”

The misguided fascination with decrying the “underclass” seems to be symptomatic of what may be considered a more basic anti-immigrant impulse that animates Habermas’s liberalism, and which is decisively operative in his formulation of “constitutional patriotism.” Habermas maintains that “cultural” liberties must be subordinate to political loyalty: “Of course, the claim to coexist with equal rights is subject to the proviso that the protected [cultural, ethnic, and religious] faiths and practices must not contradict the reigning constitutional principles (as they are interpreted by the political culture)”12 “Multiculturalism,” in other words, whatever that may be taken to mean, may be merely tolerated or even energetically encouraged, but only contingent upon a compulsory deference to a political constitution and legal regime – more or less embodying putatively “universal” democratic principles and cosmopolitan values – which have nonetheless already been established by the dominant (national) “culture.” Although nativism – as a term for anti-immigrant hostility or, more blandly, the commitment to restrict or exclude immigration – has a peculiarly (U.S.) “American” genealogy and does not have much currency outside of the United States, I propose it as a more precise analytic category than the more psychologistic and one-dimensional concept xenophobia. As I have argued in greater detail elsewhere13, nativism is best apprehended precisely as native-ism

a promotion of the priority of “natives,” on no other grounds than their being such. In this sense, nativism thus operates inextricably as a politics of identity animating all nationalisms. And, with or without all the associated assumptions (however fictive or spectral) of common ancestry, mutual kinship, and shared substance, any such notion of “native” identity at the base of nationhood is inextricably bound up with an assumption of natal entitlement. Thus, the purported “inclusion” of “immigrants” into the more elemental and fundamental “national community” inevitably sustains and upholds the primacy and priority of “natives” that is the submerged identitarian commitment of nationalism itself. Despite Habermas’ overt if cautious endorsement of “multiculturalism” and his explicit cosmopolitanism, the liberal notion of constitutional patriotism that he has promoted nonetheless retains an unseemly residue of civic nationalism deeply committed to (and entangled in all the contradictions, conundrums, and lacunae of) upholding the political prerogatives of “natives.”

It is telling that Habermas’ argument for constitutional patriotism, in at least one important earlier iteration14, cites as its pertinent authority Peter Schuck and Roger Smith’s Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity15, a work whose decisive polemical purpose and most palpable practical intent was to elaborate the putative constitutionality of the case for the rescinding the birthright U.S. citizenship of the U.S.-born children of undocumented migrants. Schuck and Smith’s book, ostensibly preoccupied with properly scholastic and distinctly liberal questions of consent, signalled a politically significant intervention on the side of “immigration control” and the restriction of citizenship in the United States. By supplying an academic and legal rationale for migrant exclusion and the restriction of citizenship rights for the children of undocumented migrants, Schuck and Smith advanced a profound articulation of what I call liberal nativism. Similarly rejecting birthright citizenship as sufficient grounds for political membership, Habermas contends:

“In democratic states, which understand themselves as an association of free and equal citizens, membership depends on the principle of voluntariness. Here, the usual ascriptive characteristic of domicile and birth (jus soli and jus sanguinis) by no means justify a person’s being irrevocably subjected to the sovereign authority of that country”.16

Thus, while he emphasises the consent and volition required for an individual citizen’s subjection to the state’s power, and otherwise appears to repudiate ascriptive (effectively, accidental) qualifications for political membership, Habermas likewise affirms implicitly what is ultimately the prohibitive premium that Schuck and Smith put on the “consent” of the established (and presumptively entitled) national polity to finally certify whether or not particular migrants may be admitted for inclusion. “Voluntariness,” after all, works in both directions, albeit with far greater coercive force from one side (the “community”) than from that of individual (migrant) petitioners for inclusion.

In a remarkable ruse of distinctly post-colonial cynical reason, Habermas elsewhere appeals: “Assuming that the autonomously developed state order is indeed shaped by ethics, does the right to self-determination not include the right of a nation to affirm its identity vis-à-vis immigrants who could give a different cast to this historically developed political-cultural form of life?”17. Agonistic ethical provisos notwithstanding, it is revealing that Habermas glosses such putative manifestations of national “self-determination” as mere acts devoted to “affirming” an (already-established, “historically established”) national “identity” and a “form of life” which awkwardly couples the political with the ever-unspecified “cultural.” In a peculiar but predictable reversal of the radical open-endedness and forcefully imaginative futurity intrinsic to the very concept of self-determination, the insular version that Habermas upholds for Europe in the face of migration, it seems, can only look backward. As Paul Gilroy has noted in his tellingly titled Postcolonial Melancholia, with specific regard to Britain but also referring to postcolonial Europe, in general, there is “a morbid fixation with the fluctuating substance of national culture and identity,” which moreover is unmistakably associated with “a refusal to think about racism as something that structures the life of the postimperial polity”18 For Habermas, this recourse to the otherwise (by his own accounting) anachronistic language self-determination is particularly contradictory. Elsewhere, he is acutely aware of the sheer contingency of “how the universe of those who come together to regulate their common life by means of positive law [is] composed”19. Thus, he is meticulously reserved about the “theoretical mistake with grave practical consequences” involved in assuming that the question of defining the boundaries of a political community could ever “be answered in normative terms with reference to a ‘right to national self-determination’”20.

Yet, in light of Gilroy’s sense of a concomitant if tacit and unacknowledged refusal to confront the enduring toxicity of racism as a defining socio-political fact of the European condition, the equivocation in Habermas around this question may disclose the deeper and more insidious co-presence of ambivalence and disavowal. Here, it suffices for Habermas that a European entitlement to one or the other historically sanctioned national “identity” be juxtaposed with “immigrants” who disruptively introduce various kinds of unsettling difference21. There, the line from this “explosive potential of multiculturalism”22 leads circuitously but unfailingly to the “aimless” rebellions and generalised moral corrosion of a degenerate “underclass”23. Morbidity, indeed. To return to the earlier themes associated with this latter gesture, then, there are two glaring omissions in Habermas’ hand-wringing: namely, colonialism (as the historical legacy without which the European nation-state itself, historically and materially, is finally inconceivable) and racism (as the contemporary dynamic without which the literally post-colonial character of Europe is truly incomprehensible). Indeed, the elision of European racisms – as the most palpable manifestation of the postcolonial condition of Europe – serves above all to render invisible that postcoloniality itself, and colludes with the insinuation that racist or nativist outbursts or movements within Europe are nothing more than populist reaction formations, provoked by the unseemly presence of the migrants themselves. Hence, after all the protracted calamities perpetrated or perpetuated by European colonialism and the subsequently tragic or disgraceful demise of the multifarious anti-colonial projects in what was formerly known as the Third World, according to Habermas, it is now supposed to be the prerogative of European nation-states to lay claim to their sacrosanct “right” of self-determination – against the myriad refugees and migrants who allegedly menace them with Third Worldisation?

Much as Europe truly was “literally the creation of the Third World,” in Frantz Fanon’s memorable formulation24, it is likewise true that the so-called Third World was literally Europe’s creation, and remains its rightful inheritance.25 In the wake of the end of the Cold War (which bestowed upon the decolonised their specifically third-worldliness), Balibar has suggested the image of “two humanities.” Historically constituted by the global racism of capitalist (colonial) modernity, this bifurcated humanity is comprised of suband super-human categories, associated with abject destitution and gross overdevelopment, respectively. These “tendentially incompatible masses” confront one another, however, on an unprecedented scale and, ever more ubiquitously, within the same spaces of practical everyday life.26 Without ever ceasing to be excruciatingly unequal and significantly segregated, these two human camps become ensnared anew amidst the unforeseen physical proximities and incidental intimacies that arise with shared spaces of cohabitation, work and production, and, to a lesser but not negligible extent, also consumption. This trans-national and decidedly post-colonial reconfiguration of global class inequalities marks an unfinished decolonisation, indeed.27 It is emblazoned as before by bluntly racialised differences, in a peculiar but predictable “recolonisation” of “immigrants” and “immigration”.28 Now, however, in a proliferation of postcolonial metropolitan spaces, regimented under the fastidious juridical constellations of citizen and alien, these inequalities come as never before to operate under the banners of the native and its inimical but ineffable other – as mere differences of “identity.”29

Indeed, new dynamics of racialisation and new formations of racism become inextricable from the social production of migrants’ “differences” in ways that, as often as not (or rather, more often than not), dissimulate their racisms and dis-articulate “race” and “immigration,” precisely through the politics of nativism. As we have seen in the example of Habermas, with recourse to this pronouncedly spatialised politics of identitarian difference, “race” need not always speak its name. There is not only the persistent and pernicious reification of the putative “inside” and “outside” of the space of “the nation”30 or alternately, and increasingly, of “Europe” as such,31 there are also “ghettoes” and even “inner cities”32 and finally, there remains the notorious “Third World” itself, whose downward spiral of misery never ceases to be mobilised as the implicit evidence that the formerly colonised truly were better off under European rule, and really were not capable of ever governing themselves, after all. The so-called Third World appears to have ineffably seeped in through the cracks, and has apparently gained prominence in Europe in precisely inverse relation to its receding significance on the scale of global geopolitics. This is especially disconcerting for a Europe that previously might have imagined itself to be safely insulated and aloof from the consequences of the very disasters originally wrought by its own colonial enterprises in the places associated with that bedevilled designation, “the Third World.” The amorphous mass attributed to the socalled Third World’s human crisis gets transposed now as a “crisis” for Europe, and is refigured as a comparably nebulous “underclass” composed of “immigrant” denizens, whose alleged pathologies now “penetrate the pores” of the supposed interior of Europe.

Of course, this formerly static (immobile) space of “underdevelopment” and cultural “backwardness” has managed to work this magic trick of relocating itself only inasmuch as the “place” and the people were always rendered synonymous. The people, as migrants – mobilised and in motion – wear the stigmata of the Third World’s bad news on their faces, and all over their bodies – in their flesh, their hair, their teeth, their clothing, their food. The inevitably heterogeneous and exorbitantly more convoluted dimensions of “race” in these contemporary manifestations, in any event, render the seductive but illusory coherences of “biological” categories distinctly less meaningful, less useful. Instead, the apparently race-neutral and presumptively “legitimate” politics of citizenship may serve to achieve the elision of “race” with the full panoply of nativist conceits entailed by the ever elusive and evasive phantom called “national identity.” Likewise, with various liberal and cosmopolitan guises, as in Habermas, the promotion of the priorities of “natives” may even masquerade as a piously multiculturalist or even as an avowedly “anti-racist” politics – a nativism, so to speak, “from the left”.33 Nonetheless, from across the political spectrum, in one country after another, the “new” European nativists authorise themselves (as citizens) to deliberate over the “problem” of “immigration,” clamouring in unison, demanding and debating: “What, then, do we do with them?” In effect, they pose one and the same question: What to do about a Third World that has over-stepped its bounds and dared to rise out of its place? What to do about this Third World run amok?”

The more noise and heat generated from this sort of nativist controversy, the more that the veritable inclusion of those incessantly targeted for exclusion proceeds apace. Their “inclusion,” of course, is finally about the subordination of their labour, which can be best accomplished only to the extent that their incorporation is permanently beleaguered with the kinds of exclusionary and racist campaigns that ensure that this inclusion is precisely a form of subjugation. What is at stake, then, is a larger socio-political (and legal) process of inclusion through exclusion, labour importation (whether overt or covert) premised upon protracted deportability.34 If Habermas worries that this has the menacing odour of a potentially explosive mix, however, it is all the more urgent and crucial that we begin to recognise that, if anything, the dynamic is more accurately depicted as one of implosion.

Almost half a century ago, in the midst of the more or less violent convulsions of decolonisation and the certain and irreversible demise of European colonial power on a planetary scale, Frantz Fanon, in Les damnés de la terrre, famously proclaimed that “the European game [had] finally ended,” that Europe was “running headlong into the abyss”35 It was, he reasoned, plainly time to leave this Europe behind. And yet, despite his sober and righteously damning assessment, Fanon’s anti-colonial critique, which summarily conjured forth the fact of our universal post-colonial condition, was splendidly generous with regard to the plausible redemption of Europeans, in spite of Europe. His sage recommendation remains as pertinent today as ever, and indeed, its urgency has only intensified:

“The Third World does not mean to organize a great crusade of hunger against the whole of Europe. What it expects from those who for centuries have kept it in slavery is that they will help it to rehabilitate mankind, and make man victorious everywhere once and for all…. This huge task, which consists of reintroducing mankind into the world, the whole of mankind, will be carried out with the indispensable help of the European peoples, who themselves must realize that in the past they have often joined the ranks of our common masters where colonial questions were concerned. To achieve this, the European peoples must first decide to wake up and shake themselves, use their brains, and stop playing the

stupid game of the Sleeping Beauty”36.

 

References

Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Latino Studies at Columbia University. The reflections developed in this essay are the product of concerns that have run parallel to much of my previous scholarly work, but which have crystallized in the numerous exchanges afforded by various invitations to present my work in Europe and then by a year spent in Britain as a Marie Curie research fellow. My thoughts on this topic have been particularly stimulated by conversations and collaborations with Bridget Anderson, Rutvica Andrijasevic, Gurminder Bhambra, Nahum Chandler, Manu Grez, Serhat Karakayali, Shahram Khosravi, Sandro Mezzadra, Dimitris Papadopolous, Nathalie Peutz, Enrica Rigo, Oscar Salemink, Sanjay Sharma, Bart van der Steen, Helle Stenum, Sarah K. van Walsum, and Hans-Rudolf Wicker. I am also grateful to Thomas Spijkerboer and Martijn Stronks for their interest in my work and their persistence in facilitating my participation in this publication project. 1 J. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1998, p. 123.
2 D.T. Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, Malden: Blackwell 1993, pp. 165-166.
3 Idem, p. 172.
4 Habermas 1998, supra note 1, p. 117; emphasis added.
5 Ibid.
6 Idem, p. 115.
7 Idem, p. 120.
8 Idem, p. 122; emphasis in original.
9 Idem, p. 122.

10

É. Balibar, ‘Racism and Crisis’, in: É. Balibar & I. Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, New York: Verso 1991, pp. 219-220, emphasis in original. 11 L. Wacquant, ‘Three Pernicious Premises in the Study of the American Ghetto’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 1997-2, p. 349.
12 Habermas 1998, supra note 1, p. 118.
13 N. De Genova, Working the Boundaries: Race, Space, and “Illegality” in Mexican Chicago, Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2005, p. 56-94.
14
J. Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe’ Praxis International 1992-1, p. 1-19.
15
P.H. Schuck & R. M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity, New Haven: Yale University Press 1985.
16 Habermas 1992, supra note 14, p. 5.
17
Habermas 1998, supra note 1, p. 228.
18
P. Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia, New York: Columbia University Press 2005, p. 12.
19 Habermas 1998, supra note 1, p. 115.
20
Idem, p. 116.
21
Idem, p. 228.
22
Idem, p. 117.
23 Idem, p. 123.
24 F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New York: Grove Weidendeld 1961/1963, p. 102.
25
For reasons that I need not expound upon here, given the scope of the present essay, the Third World was likewise the creation of the United States, and is no less its rightful inheritance as well. For some consideration of this proposition, see N. De Genova, ‘Introduction: Latino and Asian Racial Formations at the Frontiers of U.S. Nationalism’, in: N. De Genova (ed.), Racial Transformations: Latinos and Asians Remaking the United States, Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2006, pp. 1-20; N. De Genova, ‘The Stakes of an Anthropology of the United States’, CR: The New Centennial Review 2007-2, pp. 231-277.
26 É. Balibar, ‘Racism and Nationalism’, in: É. Balibar & I. Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, New York: Verso 1991, p. 44. See also É. Balibar, ‘Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe Today’, New Left Review 1991, p.14; B. Anderson, ‘Exodus’, Critical Inquiry 1994, p.321.
27
É. Balibar, ‘Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe Today’, New Left Review 1991, p.12; É. Balibar, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2004, p. 7; É. Balibar, ‘Europe, An ‘Unimagined’ Frontier of Democracy’, Diacritics 2003-3/4, p.42
28
É. Balibar, ‘Europe as Borderland’, The Alexander von Humboldt Lecture in Human Geography, University of Nijmegen, Netherlands (November 10, 2004), p. 38-42; available at: www.ru.nl/socgeo/colloquium/Europe%20as%20Borderland.pdf; See also De Genova 2006, note 25; S. Mezzadra, ‘Citizen and Subject: A Postcolonial Constitution for the European Union?’ Situations 2006-2, p. 39. M. Bojadijev & I. Saint-Saëns, ‘Borders, Citizenship, War, Class: A Discussion with Étienne Balibar and Sandro Mezzadra’, New Formations 2006, pp. 15-18; S. Mezzadra & F. Rahola, ‘The Postcolonial Condition: A Few Notes on the Quality of Historical Time in the Global Present’, Postcolonial Text 2006-1; available at: http://postcolonial.org/index.php/pct/article/view/393/139.
29 For a fuller discussion see N. De Genova, ‘The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement’ in: N. De Genova & N Peutz (eds.), The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement, Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2009.
30 See also De Genova 2006, supra note 25; De Genova 2007, supra note 25; De Genova 2009, supra note 29.
31 See R. Andrijasevic, ‘From Exception to Excess: Detention and Deportations across the Mediterranean Space’, in: N. De Genova & N. Peutz (eds.), The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement, Durham: Duke University Press 2009; S. Karakayali & E. Rigo, ‘Mapping the European Space of Circulation’, in: N. De Genova & N. Peutz (eds.), The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement, Durham: Duke University Press 2009; D. Papadopoulos et al., Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century, London: Pluto Press 2008.
32 L. Wacquant, Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality, Malden: Polity Press 2008.
33 De Genova 2005, supra note 13, p. 68-79; Balibar 1991, supra note 27, p. 15.
34 See N. De Genova, ‘Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life’, Annual Review of Anthropology 2002, pp. 419-447 and De Genova 2009, supra note 29. 35 Fanon 1961/63, supra note 24, p. 312.
36 Idem, p. 106.





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