THE MORALISATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN DUTCH INTEGRATION DISCOURSE

Willem Schinkel

Introduction

‘Citizenship’ has been of renewed interest for social scientists and political philosophers for a few decennia now.\(^1\) The renewed academic popularity of the notion of citizenship is often seen related to the process of globalization.\(^2\) Citizenship traditionally is a mechanism of in- and exclusion of states.\(^3\) It is the modern, democratic form of political membership. As in the formulation of T.H. Marshall\(^4\), it denotes a juridically described set of rights and duties. Consequently, the citizen can be regarded as a bundle of such rights and duties. By regulating entrance to the state, citizenship at once secured the borders of the nation. As the modern state/society differentiation, given the ‘regionalised’ notion of society\(^5\) entailed a relative overlap between ‘society’ and the nation, citizenship automatically meant inclusion in society. This relative overlap between nation and society was possible only for a brief time in which society, which had been differentiated from the state\(^6\), formed an ethnically relatively homogeneous whole. The state thus guarded the territorial borders of society. Precisely such a ‘regionalised’ notion of society loses credibility in times of globalisation.\(^7\) By ‘society’, I here denote a discursive construct which is hegemonic in that it occupies an ‘empty’ space and turns it into the essence of the social collectivity.\(^8\) ‘Society’ is therefore a

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discursive construct, which is strategic in its in- and exclusion.\(^9\) Significantly, subjects participating in the economy or other spheres can yet be said to remain ‘outside society’, as discourse on ‘integration’ illustrates. The difference between membership of the nation-state and membership of society is precisely the fact that membership of society is non-codified and discursive in nature.\(^10\)

For a brief (‘Marshallian’) period in the 20\(^{th}\) century, citizenship functioned as a guarantor of membership of both nation-state and the discursive domain of society, but in an age in which flows of migration have become permanent, that is no longer plausible. In post-war Europe, political membership meant, in practice, membership of society only for those who were connected by birth to nation and state and thereby to society.\(^11\) In what he calls ‘ideal theory’, such a model is present for instance in the work of John Rawls: “a democratic society, like any political society, is to be viewed as a complete and closed social system (...) we are not seen as joining society at the age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into a society where we will lead a complete life”.\(^12\) Such a vision of nation-state and society is no longer unproblematic.\(^13\) It is important to note that there were always excommunications of certain groups, and the membership of society of, for instance, the poor and of women (especially those marrying foreign men) has been problematised many times. Yet crucial in today’s situation in Western Europe is that it is the ethnic heterogeneity of society which leads to discursive excommunications explicitly thematising the problematic citizenship of immigrants and their children. When society is entered by people not tied through nativity to the nation, the nation can no longer be seen to overlap with society. While the nation-state is, in Giorgio Agamben’s formulation, “a State that makes nativity or birth \( (nascita) \) (that is, naked human life) the foundation of its own sovereignty?”\(^14\), such a state is in need of new sources of sovereignty, of a new functional potential, when its nation no longer relatively overlaps with the society from which it is differentiated. When persons of different socialisation gain political membership, a rift occurs in the seamless overlap between state and nation, and thereby between state and society. That is to say that the modern state/society differentiation that kept both apart at a controlled distance has lost in strength. This urges analyses of citizenship and the nation-state to


move beyond ‘methodological nationalism’. The fact that the concept of citizenship nonetheless enjoys widespread popularity within the state is related to the shifted position of the state relative to society that is characteristic of globalisation. In what can be called a relative shift in discursive importance from formal to moral citizenship, a reorientation of the state vis-à-vis society takes place which has, from a sociological point of view, consequences for the contemporary role of the state.

I. Formal Citizenship & Moral Citizenship

Citizenship has, since ancient times, been regarded as having reference to inclusion in a state. At least as old is a moralisation of citizenship according to which the real citizen is an active citizen. As Thucydides states, quoting Pericles’ funeral oratory: “we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all”. Likewise, for Aristotle, the good citizen is someone actively participating in political affairs. For the Greek political philosophers, citizenship is an ethos. For Romans such as Cicero it becomes a virtus. Such approaches add the formal aspect of citizenship with a moral aspect, and they continue to exist throughout the history of political thought. The Revolutionary Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (1789) separates ‘man’ separated from ‘citizen’, and thereby ‘active’ (citoyen) from ‘passive’ (homme). Robespierre thus regarded citizenship a ‘public virtue’. I therefore wish to analytically distinguish between formal citizenship – juridically codified rights and duties of citizen-members of states – and moral citizenship – a counterfactual ideal of citizen-participation. Formal citizenship has reference to both juridical status as membership of a juridico-political order and to social rights. I thus subsume under ‘formal citizenship’ also that which has been called ‘social citizenship’ and which refers to certain social rights, as well as ‘civic citizenship’. By moral citizenship I denote something quite different which entails an extra-legal normative concept of the good citizen. It is not merely a factual and descriptive but also a counterfactual and prescriptive

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16 Thucydides 1954, supra note 3, p. 119.
17 Aristotle 1941, supra note 3, pp. 1275a-1277b.
19 See, for the consequences of this: Agamben 1996, supra note 14.
20 Schinkel 2007, supra note 1.
notion. Nonetheless, every formal conception of citizenship is bound to entail an aspect of moral citizenship. The distinction is thus analytical and serves the analysis of relative weight given to formal or moral aspects of citizenship. One might be tempted to construe liberal citizenship as promoting formal citizenship and communitarian and republican citizenship as moral citizenship. But these conceptions of citizenship have formal as well as moral aspects. ‘Moral citizenship’, in my use of the term here, thus denotes not a substantive theory of citizenship, but aspects of various approaches to it which are given more relative weight in communitarian theories of citizenship than in liberal ones. The formal/moral distinction I propose has reference not to theoretical or practical notions of citizenship but to aspects of both theory and practice.

II. Moralisation and Virtualisation of Citizenship

‘Integration’ as ‘citizenship’

Dutch integration policy discourse has evolved through several phases. Its current phase can be called a culturist phase. In this phase, ‘cultural integration’ takes precedence over ‘socio-economic integration’, and an individual focus is preferred over a former group-focus where the meaning of the notion of ‘integration’ is concerned. Discourse on integration has been largely restricted to cultural issues and, more specifically, to issues relating mainly to ‘Islam’. This phase in integration discourse, which continues up to today, can be termed culturist to the extent that it is permeated by a culturalised form of racism, which some have termed ‘neo-racism’ or ‘cultural racism’. As Schinkel has argued, however, culturism can best be regarded as a ‘discourse of alterity’ that is an equivalent to racism and amounts to the normative observation based on a supposedly cultural distinction, instead of a natural one, as in the case of racism. Culturism

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27 With Habermas 1998, supra note 22.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
33 Schinkel 2007, supra note 9.
problematises ‘cultures’ as such for their lack of adjustment to ‘Culture’
dubbed as ‘the dominant Dutch culture’.

At the start of this phase in integration discourse and the
accompanying policy, ‘citizenship’ becomes, according to parliament, “the
leading principle for the new vision on the presence of persons from diverse
cultures in the Netherlands”. Citizenship thereby becomes a ‘choice’ for
“participation in Dutch society”. What comes to the fore with the
thematisation of citizenship in integration discourse is, on the one hand, a
culture-centered way of thinking – practices exemplifying the ‘active citizen’
are practices normalised according to ‘the dominant culture’ – and on the
other hand a loyalty-centered way of thinking – the ‘good citizen has ‘loyalty’
towards ‘society’. Citizenship becomes a matter of inclusion in ‘society’ and it
comes a thoroughly cultural matter. This became especially succinct in the
2007 discussion in parliament on double nationalities, in which the
double passports of two secretaries of state (one Dutch-Moroccan and the
other Dutch-Turkish) were problematised as ‘lack of loyalty’ to the
Netherlands. Loyalties started to dominate the political debate on integration
and citizenship around 1992-1993, and the cabinet took up a position
deemed ‘from the 19th century’ a few years earlier. The equalisation between
‘integration’ and ‘citizenship’, or rather the definition of ‘integration’ as
‘citizenship’, dates back to 1994. Citizenship became the central focus of
policies of integration. Politically, the equalisation between integration and
citizenship was promoted in the conservative party, which states: “…the
integrated immigrant has become a citizen, in the widest possible sense of the
word. Thus regarded, ‘integration’ equals the classical notion of
‘citizenship’.” The agenda-setting cabinet-paper Contourennota Integratiebeleid
Etnische Minderheden (Memorandum Integration Policy Ethnic Minorities) (1994)
reads: “The primary goal of integration policy is (…) the realisation of the
activating citizenship of persons from ethnic minority groups.” In a letter
from the minister of Alien Affairs and Integration in 2003, and in the

36 Tweede Kamer, quoted in: F. Driouichi, _De casus Inburgering en Nationaliteitswetgeving_,
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2007, p. 25.
38 B.P. Vermeulen, _Vrijheid, gelijkheid, burgerschap. Over verschuivende fundamenten van het
Nederlandse minderhedenrecht en –beleid: immigratie, integratie, onderwijs en religie_, Den Haag: Sdu
Uitgevers 2007, p. 54.
39 I. van Huis, & A. de Regt ‘Tussen dwang en dialoog. Maatschappijoriëntatie in
40 Driouichi 2007, supra note 36, p. 124.
41 Beleidsopvolging Minderhedendebate: Advies in opdracht van de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken,
1994.
42 For instance in the VVD paper Beleidsnotaie van niet-westerse migranten in Nederland – Policy-
43 VVD, Beleidsnotaie van niet-westerse migranten in Nederland, 1994 p. 4.
44 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, _Contourennota Integratiebeleid Etnische Minderheden_, Den
Miljoenennota (cabinet budget paper) from 2004, the equalisation between ‘citizenship’ and ‘integration’ appears complete and both are put on a par. In 2003, ‘integration’ is defined as “shared citizenship”. In 2004, it is described as “shared citizenship of minorities and allochtons.” The state sponsored ‘measurement’ of ‘integration’ starts from a similar premise in 2006: “Integration can be regarded as a process of acquiring citizenship and participating in society by allochtons in three societal domains.” Likewise, analyses with more distance to policy put ‘citizenship regimes’ on a par with ‘integration regimes’.

The recent cabinet paper on integration, Integratienota 2007-2011 (Integration Memorandum 2007-2011), which was drafted by a new and relatively left-wing minister, has been perceived as a break with the xenophobia and harshness of recent years, but, illustrating the fundamental nature of the shifted discursive parameters of Dutch policy discourse, it brought twofold continuity: 1) ‘citizenship’ remains the dominant accent of the government’s integration policy; 2) a neoliberal thematisation of ‘individual’ or ‘own responsibility’, which came up during the culturist phase of integration discourse, remains. The paper for instance says, in a paragraph entitled ‘Active citizenship is now needed’, on its goals: “societal emancipation and social integration, and within these a strong accent on citizenship.” The subtitle of the Integration Memorandum, Make sure you’re a part of it! (Zorg dat je erbij hoort!), stresses the importance attached to ‘individual responsibility’. Thus, the government makes “an appeal to all citizens to participate in society on the basis of mutual acceptance and equality.” That, of course, presupposes the possibility to not take part of society. Consequently, ‘bridging-function’ is expected of citizenship. But because citizenship is mostly a case of individual responsibility (such as ‘raising your children well’ or ‘making sure you’re a part of it’), the bridging effort is placed solely on the side of those citizens whose citizenship is in need of improvement.

The Virtualisation of Citizenship
I wish to stress two related processes that are the consequence of what has been described above: 1) citizenship is increasingly framed as moral citizenship; 2) citizenship is being virtualised. The moralisation of citizenship entails a relative shift in focus toward the moral aspect of citizenship. The

47 CBS & WODC 2006, supra note 45, p. 3.
50 Idem, p. 6.
52 Schinkel 2007, supra note 9.
virtualisation of citizenship means that citizenship thereby becomes, instead of an actuality (a juridical status), a virtuality (a possible but absent actuality in diffuse and shifting moral terms). I here make an evocative use of the syntax of ‘virtual’ to indicate as well that citizenship has increasingly become a virtus, a virtue as in the Roman humanist notion of citizenship. The ‘messier’ and more diffuse concept of moral citizenship blurs the formal side of citizenship through the discursive framing of the idea that one is only a real citizen when one is an active citizen. The equalisation between ‘integration’ and ‘citizenship’ entails a virtualisation of citizenship to the extent that the citizenship of those who are citizens in the formal sense but are construed as insufficiently integrated is reduced from actuality to virtuality. Not all Dutch ‘migrants’ and therefore not all those who are the object of assessments of ‘integration’ are in possession of the formal citizenship status. There is for instance a difference between the juridical statuses of ‘citizenship’ and ‘denizenship’ among migrants. What is crucial, however, is that such notions refer to inclusion in the nation-state, while ‘integration’ refers primarily to inclusion in ‘society’. There is, in the Netherlands, a significant number of people who are formal citizens but who are at the same time the object of problematisations of ‘integration’. Since ‘integration’ equals ‘citizenship’, and more specifically with a heavy emphasis on the moral aspects thereof, the citizenship of this group is downplayed, in effect virtualised, and they are thus discursively disenfranchised. Certainly, the emphasis on moral citizenship can lead to juridical codification into aspects of formal citizenship. Up until the present, however, such codification is scant and the discourse on citizenship runs into its own limitations and formulates forms of unenforceable force. In parliament, it was noted in 2005 that, beyond formal and juridically codified demands, nothing could be demanded from migrants: “we must accept the fact that there are limits to what we can enforce in the name of shared citizenship…” Yet the limits to formal demands at once define the terrain of a culturist discursive force which poses unenforceable demands. These limits mark the border between state and society. The traversing of these limits by integration-cum-citizenship policies illustrate the moralization of citizenship as a diffuse hybrid between the state’s force and the government’s ideology on civic behavior. It is precisely the power of the state vis-à-vis the citizen whose moral citizenship is problematised that shapes the virtualisation of citizenship as a form of unenforceable force. This becomes visible in the reversal of the ‘integration’ trajectory. Before the culturist phase in policies of integration it was assumed that once the immigrant had become a citizen in the formal sense (s)he would in time commit him- or herself to society and

55 Schinkel 2007, supra note 9.
become a citizen in the moral sense as well. Currently, however, it is the other way round.\textsuperscript{58} As one Dutch legal scholar has noted, it is now predominantly assumed that the migrant is first to become a citizen in the moral sense and to integrate into society before he or she can become a citizen in the formal sense. In that sense, the immigrant now has to earn permanent residence and nationality by proving his or her acceptance of the fundamental norms of Dutch society.\textsuperscript{59} A double process thus takes place. On the one hand, newly arrived immigrants are required to first gain moral citizenship in order to apply for formal citizenship status as crowning achievement of their becoming-citizen (\textit{inburgering}). On the other hand, many who have formal citizenship status but who purportedly lack ‘integration’ as a consequence of their lack of ‘cultural adjustment’ are construed as only halfway there. For them, formal citizenship status is indeed a purely formal thing, and in their case the loyalties involved in moral citizenship are the real prize.

Precisely because moral citizenship is not codified but a vague and diffuse aggregate notion, it is a strategic mechanism for the in- and exclusion of society, which can be ever shifted and adapted, thereby continuously redrawing the inside/outside border that it helps to draw. It is a discursive construct and is thus eventually unenforceable, but, unlike membership of the nation-state, membership of society is non-codified and discursive in nature.\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, the paradox of unenforceable force can be solved by the invention of quasi-legal policy-practices such as the Rotterdam ‘Intervention Teams’ who enter homes without the proper legal warrant in areas designated through special directive as ‘Hotspot Zones’.\textsuperscript{61} Such ‘policy experiments’ framed as ‘exceptional measures’ and as ‘administrative innovation’ are hailed by politicians and policy-makers alike precisely because of the fact that they tend to circumvent legal codification.

\textit{‘Active citizenship’ and the ‘autochtone/allochtone’ differentiation}

The differentiation between ‘active’ and ‘non-active’ citizens is, in part, discursively facilitated by a discursive differentiation between ‘Dutch natives’ and all other forms of ethnicity. Just preceding the culturist phase in Dutch policies of integration the 1989 report \textit{Allochtons Policy} was published by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR; the official state think tank in the Netherlands). The WRR advised against the use of the notion ‘ethnic minority’, which had been central in the second phase of integration policy (known then as ‘minorities-policy’). They suggested

\textsuperscript{60} Laclau & Mouffe 2001, \textit{supra} note 8; Bauman 2002, \textit{supra} note 10; Schinkel 2007, \textit{supra} note 9.
replacing what they held to be a stigmatising concept by ‘allochtons’.

62 These were contrasted with ‘autochtons’, denoting native Dutch. The effect of this highly successful terminological intervention was the creation of a totalising opposition. Whereas ‘minorities’ was formerly not opposed to ‘majority’, now an opposition existed between ‘allochtons’ (lumping all ‘ethnics’ together) and ‘autochtons’ (literally meaning ‘of this soil’, which is curious given Dutch *jus sanguinis*). This opposition soon made its way into policy. More specifically, a differentiation is made between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western allochtons’. The latter category consists, among others, of EU-nationals and US-nationals, but also of Japanese, South Koreans and Indonesians. With the exception of Indonesians, the category ‘non-western’ in effect means ‘non-poor’.

63 On the other hand, what is dubbed as ‘non-western’ is a specifically cultural selection. Certain ‘ethnics’ are constructed as ‘non-western’ and, in the culturist phase in the integration discourse, as intrinsically problematic. ‘Ethnicity’ is selectively articulated in the discourse of citizenship policies. It is not so much the fear of ‘multicultural reification’ that puts policy makers off addressing such categories as groups, but rather the circumventing of the paradoxical possibilities of empowerment that such addressing involves, which Michel Foucault has termed the ‘tactical polyvalence of discourse’: the categories imposed on subjects are at the same time the vessels of their emancipation.

64 This undergirded policies in the 1980s. Current discourse radically departs from what is *a posteriori* constructed as ‘multiculturalism’ in a ‘new realism’, which sees things as they really are and is not hampered by ‘political correctness’ and which thus takes rhetorical shape of a *multiculturalism*. So while ‘ethnic minorities’ and their quasi-official spokespersons (which indeed only had the effect of legitimating policies) are no longer the addressee of policies, ‘ethnicity’ is omnipresent, and again not in an anthropological sense of a constructed and ‘owned’ identity, but in a reified sense. The *Integration Memorandum 2007-2011. Make sure you’re a part of it!* (2007) signals the fact that “people withdraw in their own ethnic circle or their religious faith, and live so to speak with their backs to society.”

Likewise, when ‘crime’ is mentioned, it is in association with fundamentalism, radicalism, non-western allochtones or minorities, or sometimes by mentioning ‘Antillians’ and ‘Moroccans’. Given their ‘overrepresentation’ in crime figures, ethnically specific policies are initiated. The problems are

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65 Schinkel 2007, supra note 9.


deemed most severe among ‘Moroccans’ (who are mentioned 122 times in the 106-page memorandum).

Thus, when citizenship is thematised, this happens, upon superficial glance, in a general sense, referring to all citizens – thereby meaning all citizens in the formal sense. Yet an ethnic’ emphasis on ‘allochtones’ is ever present and thereby the emphasis shifts toward ‘citizens in the moral sense. The generality of tone remains but at the same time the focus is on specific persons. The Integration Memorandum 2007-2011 (2007) again illustrates this. The government “focuses in its citizenship policy on all citizens of our country. It addresses people not on the basis of their being different but on their active participation in and shared responsibility for society.” Nonetheless, throughout policy papers such as this Integration Memorandum, it becomes clear that the crucial difference lies between ‘autochtones’ and ‘(non-western) allochtones’ and their relative degrees of ‘active participation’:

“It just as is expected from autochtones, allochtones are expected to do their best to conquer [sic] a place in society by learning the language, having and finishing education, gain income and take responsibility in raising their children. It is also about curiosity with respect to the ways of Dutch society and the life-world of (autochtone) co-citizens, especially where the Dutch culture and history are concerned. By participating in society it becomes possible to increasingly identify with these.”

It is thus the ‘allochtone’ population in the Netherlands which is the primary addressee of policy texts on active citizenship. Hence the formulation above: ‘just as is expected from autochtones…’. At the same time, a paragraph is devoted to ‘radicalisation’, by which only a turn towards Islamic fundamentalism is denoted. The subtext of such policy statements is a culturist discourse of integration as cultural assimilation. The one-sided thematisation of the marker ‘ethnic’ thus has the effect of a ‘dispensation of ethnicity’ for native Dutch ‘autochtones’, in which ‘Dutchness’ becomes a neutral category, which is all the more plausible given its ‘whiteness’ and its allegiance to a universalist ‘culture’ of the Enlightenment. All that is ‘ethnic’ is possibly intrinsically problematic and is lumped together under the marker ‘allochtones’.

‘Active citizenship’ now appears as the panacea for the two problems addressed by the Integration Memorandum 2007-2011: the fact that ‘autochtones’ experience fear of Muslims, and the fact that ‘allochtones’ feel unaccepted. Active citizenship as a form of cultural adjustment on the side of the latter solves both problems in a universal (national) language of ‘citizenship’. In that context of collective identity construction on the ‘autochtone’ side, the memorandum contains the plans for a ‘Charter Responsible Citizenship’, notes that the ‘Dutch Canon’ has been presented

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69 Idem, p. 98.
70 Ibid.
71 Schinkel 2007, supra note 9.
and takes the initiative to open a ‘Museum of National History’. Meanwhile, similar discursive divisions become visible at the local level of citizenship policies.

Conclusion: the State & the Virtualization of Citizenship

In The Politics of Recognition, Charles Taylor emphasises the need to beware of a differentiation between ‘first-class’ citizens and ‘second-class’ citizens. The virtualisation of citizenship amounts to just such a differentiation, by distinguishing ‘citizens’ from ‘non-integrated’ persons who are discursively exorcised from society. The virtualisation of citizenship leads to the discursive articulation of certain citizens – immigrants who are citizens in the formal sense – as quasi-subjects, at once protected and feared within the nation-state. The very emphasis on moral citizenship in a state-initiated policy discourse indicates a shift in the state’s orientation. In general, the state slowly moves away from social welfare and direct interference with economic life towards new forms of control, surveillance and monitoring. Citizenship is one issue at which the state finds a new functional potential in times of globalisation. The moralisation and ensuing virtualisation of citizenship concerns not the formal inclusion in the nation-state, but the moral inclusion in the discursive domain of ‘society’. The end of the post-war Marshallian citizenship regime in which nation and society matched in a relatively unproblematic way was brought about by late 20th century immigration. In the conflation of ‘immigrant integration’ with ‘citizenship’, the state’s role has relatively shifted from a control of the borders of the nation-state to a control of the borders of ‘society’. A more diffuse and especially discursive process has thereby been initiated. For while inclusion in the nation-state is a juridical matter, inclusion in ‘society’ is a discursive matter that cannot be legally codified. The first is foremost a matter of formal citizenship; the second of moral citizenship. Moral citizenship can of course – with a time lag – be legally codified (and formal citizenship can be analysed for moral aspects), but that does not mean that the in- and exclusion of ‘society’ can be codified. And through the image of the ‘active citizen’, the image of ‘society’, of what society is and who belongs to it, looms large. In Dutch discourse on integration, lack of integration concerns persons ‘outside society’. The shift in focus of the state has to do with the destabilisation of the modern state/society differentiation. Given the effects of migration, it is now deemed relevant for the state to formulate the substance of moral citizenship as adherence to a ‘dominant culture’. This

73 VROM 2007, supra note 49, p. 98.
76 Jacobson 1996, supra note 11.
77 Laclau & Mouffe 2001, supra note 8; Schinkel 2007, supra note 9.
79 Schinkel 2007, supra note 9.
concerns not a respect, but an embrace, in action and thought, of that ‘culture’.\textsuperscript{80} In the control over what ‘society’ consists of by means of the moralisation of citizenship, the state finds new tasks in an age when its position has become problematic.\textsuperscript{81} The state thereby (re)gains a power of articulation in what ‘society’ is. But it can only do so at the cost of differentiating the good and active citizens from the not so good and ‘inactive’ citizens. This results in a discursive disenfranchisement that can be captured under the heading of a virtualisation of citizenship.

\textsuperscript{80} Spijkerboer 2007, \textit{supra} note 58.